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1  Onlife Technologies
After a few decades of living with Information and Communication Technologies, 
we have got so much used to their presence in our daily lives, that we hardly realize 
that the societal and cultural revolution they are causing has only just begun. While 
most of the social and political discussions regarding ICTs still focus on privacy 
issues and on the impact of social media on interpersonal relations, a whole new 
generation of ICTs is currently entering the world, with potentially revolutionary 
impacts that require careful analysis and evaluation.
Two examples of this new generation of technologies can illustrate this. First 
of all, there is the rapid development of ‘embedded’ information technology. ICTs 
are starting to merge ever more intricately with our physical environment. Walls, 
beds, doors, cars—many everyday objects are currently being equipped with forms 
of ‘ubiquitous computing’ or ‘ambient intelligence’, as a large electronics multi-
national has come to call it (Aarts and Marzano 2003). Objects in our lifeworld, in 
other words, are becoming intelligent. Hospital beds can detect if patients fall out 
of their bed or step out of it. Doors in geriatric homes can determine who is allowed 
to go outside and who is not. Cars are increasingly taking over tasks that used to 
be reserved to humans, like lane parking, making emergency stops, and refusing to 
change lanes if it is too dangerous to do so.
This intelligification of our material world will have important implications. 
Public space will literally become space with a public character—the more it be-
comes aware of us, the more we need to become aware of the fact that that is the 
case. Moreover, intelligent objects are increasingly equipped with explicitly per-
suasive abilities. Smart mirrors in waiting rooms of medical doctors can give us 
feedback on our lifestyle when entering the waiting room. Smart training equipment 
in gyms can persuade people to exercise just a bit more. Smart websites attempt to 
persuade users to buy specific things, or to become a member of specific organiza-
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tions. Our material world is developing into an active and intelligent counterpart, 
rather than a mute, stable and functional environment.
At the same time, our own access to the world is rapidly changing. With the 
advent of technologies like Google Glass, the phenomenon of ‘augmented reality’ 
is rapidly gaining influence. Google Glass consists of a pair of small, transparent 
monitors and a camera. The device provides an extra layer of information about the 
people, objects and images one sees. It has the potential to recognize the faces of 
people you meet, and provide all information available about them instantaneous-
ly—without these people noticing this. It makes it possible to send and receive mes-
sages, than can be composed with eye movements, voice input, or touch. This will 
enable people to communicate with each other in new ways, again without other 
people noticing it.
If this type of augmentations becomes widespread, this will have enormous im-
plications for virtually all dimensions of society. Educational processes will need 
to be reinvented, when all information is available to anybody all the time. The 
boundaries between the public and the private will need to be drawn again, when a 
quick glance at somebody’s face reveals all their activities on the internet. Security 
policy, privacy legislation, commercial activities—it is hard to imagine a sphere of 
society that will not be affected by the advent of augmented realities. Our lives get 
increasingly interwoven with online realities—we get ‘onlife’, as the contributors 
to this book have come to call it.
New information technologies, in sum, put us potentially at the dawn of a new 
era. While many people are focusing on the biotechnological revolution, and the 
convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cogni-
tive science, companies like Google and Philips are redesigning the world. How to 
understand these changes? And how to evaluate them?
2  Onlife Relations
Understanding the relations between humans and technologies has been one of the 
central activities of the philosophy of technology in the past decades. In mediation 
theory, the central idea has developed that we need to blur the boundaries between 
human and technology to understand the social role of technologies. Humans and 
technologies cannot be located in two separate realms, but need to be understood in 
their interrelations. At the basis of the theory of technological mediation is the work 
of the North-American philosopher Don Ihde. Ihde analyzes the various shapes that 
the relations between humans and technologies can take (Ihde 1990). His central 
thought is that technologies help to shape the relations between humans and world. 
Whenever a technology is used, it becomes a mediator between its users and their 
environment, helping to shape the character of the relations between both.
Ihde distinguishes four forms the relations between humans and technologies 
can take on. New information technologies like Google Glass, though, urge us to 
expand his framework. First, there is the ‘embodiment relation’, schematically in-
Designing the Public Sphere: Information Technologies … 219
dicated as ( human—technology) → world. In this relation, technologies are exten-
sions of the body, as it were. Humans experience the world ‘through’ the technolo-
gies here, as when wearing glasses, or using hearing aids. A relation with the world 
is also possible from the ‘hermeneutic relation’, though, schematically indicated 
as human → (technology—world). Some technologies give us access to the world 
by giving a representation of it, that requires human interpretation in order to be 
meaningful—hence the name ‘hermeneutic’—like a thermometer that gives a num-
ber rather than a sensation of temperature, or a sonogram that gives a visual rep-
resentation of an unborn child on the basis of reflected ultrasonic soundwaves. A 
third relation is the so-called ‘alterity relation’, schematically indicated as human 
→ technology (world). In this relation there is a direct interaction between humans 
and technologies, like when someone operates a copying machine, or repairs a car. 
The fourth and last relation Ihde distinguishes is the background relation, indicated 
as human (technology/world). From this relation, technologies have an impact on 
our relation with the world, without being explicitly experienced themselves. An air 
conditioning that automatically switches on and off, for instance, creates a context 
for the experience of human beings by producing noise or creating a specific tem-
perature of the room.
In all these four human-technology relations, technologies moves ever further 
aay from the human being, as it were: from an extension of our senses to a context 
for our experiences. Ihde’s analysis has made possible an entirely new direction in 
the philosophy of technology. Rather than investigating what ‘Technology’ does to 
‘Humanity’ and ‘Society’, Ihde’s approach made it possible to investigate how spe-
cific technologies mediate human actions, experiences, and interpretations. Against 
the gloomy theories of alienation that have been fashionable for a long time, it now 
becomes possible to investigate in more detail how technologies actually help to 
shape new relations between humans and world. Scientific instruments help scien-
tists to understand reality; medical-diagnostic technologies help to shape interpreta-
tions of health and illness; social media reshape social relations and friendships.
New information technologies like Ambient Intelligence and Google Glass, 
though, urge us to expand this framework (Verbeek 2011). One more step ‘further 
away’ from the human being than the background relation—but ‘closer to us’ in 
another sense—is made by technologies that create an environment in which we are 
immersed, like the smart environments with ambient intelligence that I mentioned 
above. The relations we have with such environments can be indicated as ‘immer-
sion’. Schematically these relations look like human ↔ technology/world: the tech-
nologies merge with the environment, and interact with their users.
Google Glass adds a new type of relation at the other end of the spectrum. Rather 
than merely being ‘embodied’, it adds a second layer to our world, which is often 
called an ‘augmented reality’. In addition to the sensory relation with the world 
‘through’ the glasses, it also offers a representation of the world. Technologies like 
this offer not one, but two, parallel relations with the world. We could call this a 
relation of augmentation. This relation consists of two parallel circuits: (human—
technology) → world and human → (technology—world). And this is quite a revo-
lutionary step in the relations between humans and their world. Human intentional-
P.-P. Verbeek220
ity, as phenomenologists call the human directedness at the world around them, is 
developing a bifurcation. Our attention is increasingly divided between two parallel 
tracks.
3  Onlife Mediations
New information and communication technologies, to be short, create radically new 
relations between human beings and the world around them. Not only the structure 
of these relations deserves further inquiry, but also its implications for social rela-
tions and human existence. What do all of these new information and communica-
tion technologies do to us, from the new and unanticipated relations we develop 
with them? I will limit myself again to the relations of ‘immersion’ and ‘augmenta-
tion’ that I described above.
In the relation of immersion, the material environment changes from a relatively 
stable background of our existence into an interactive context that interferes in nov-
el ways with the ways we live our lives. Smart environments with ‘ambient intelli-
gence’ are changing the character of the spaces in which our lives take shape. When 
public spaces are equipped with smart cameras that can detect suspicious behavior, 
new norms will be installed. When the doors in geriatric hospitals will have RFID 
chip readers, they can automatically determine who should be allowed to go out and 
who does not. When toilets will have sensors that can detect specific substances in 
our urine and feces, new norms regarding health and illness, and new regimes for 
healthcare will emerge.
Moreover, these ‘intelligent’ technologies can also interact with our decision-
making processes. Under the name of ‘persuasive technologies’, products and sys-
tems are being developed to persuade people to behave in specific ways. School 
toilets can detect if children have washed their hands when they leave, and urge 
them to do so when they forget. Smart mirrors in the waiting room of medical doc-
tors can recognize one’s face, and morph it into an image of what you will look like 
in 10 years if you don’t give up smoking, or eating too much, or working too hard. 
Smart windows in shops can determine the direction of one’s gaze and give extra 
lighting to articles that seem to interest specific people.
In the configuration of augmentation, technologies like Google Glass have the 
potential to radically change the character of social interactions. The mere look at 
somebody else can be enough for a face recognition system to look this person up 
on the Internet. This would result in a drastic reconfiguration of the boundaries be-
tween the public and the private. All one’s private activities that are on the Internet 
will be much more easily accessible. And all resulting information will be available 
in social interaction in a asymmetrical way, because people cannot see if the person 
they meet is simultaneously checking them on the Internet.
Also, the permanent availability of email, messaging services and Internet in-
formation will give us an increasing ‘double presence’ in the world. Our physical, 
bodily presence in concrete spaces and situations will increasingly be accompanied 
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by a virtual, but still bodily-sensorial, presence at other places, with other people, 
and in different situations. Our being-in-the-world, as Heidegger called it, is devel-
oping into a being-in-multiple-worlds.
This quick exploration of the new configurations of humans and technologies 
shows that their implications are enormous. New information technologies will in-
stall new norms for human behavior, have a political impact on how we interact in 
public space, help to shape the quality of interpersonal interactions, and so on and 
so forth. No realm of human existence will remain unaffected. Our lives will be 
mediated in radically novel ways.
At the same time it is often hard to see these mediations, because information 
technologies increasingly challenge the frameworks by which we have come to 
understand ourselves and the world we live in. Ever since the Enlightenment, we 
have understood ourselves as relatively autonomous subjects in a world of objects 
that we can investigate, manipulate, and appreciate. But the self-evidence of this 
metaphysical framework—in which subjects have intentions and freedom, while 
objects are passive and mute—is rapidly fading away, now that information and 
communication technologies have started to challenge it seriously.
On the one hand, the advent of ‘social media’ has urged us to acknowledge 
how deeply intertwined our sociality has become with materiality. When Marshall 
McLuhan claimed that ‘the medium is the message’ (McLuhan 1994/1964), it was 
hardly possible to foresee that the mediating power of new media would become so 
strong that a few decades later people would start to wonder if Google is “making us 
stupid” (Carr 2008) and if virtual sociality is making us be “alone together” (Turkle 
2011). On the other hand, the examples of ‘smart environments’ with ‘ambient in-
telligence’ have shown that our material environment now has unprecedented social 
capacities, persuading us to behave in specific ways, or reorganizing the character 
of public spaces.
Information technologies have made the boundaries between the social subject 
and the material object more porous than ever before. Social relations appear to 
be thoroughly mediated by technologies, while new technologies appear to have a 
profound social dimension. This situation is a serious challenge, not only for our 
metaphysical frameworks, but also for our self-understanding and for our ethical 
and approaches to technology. How are we going to deal with this new situation?
4  Onlife Governance
The blurring of the boundaries between humanity and technology that new ICTs are 
bringing about has serious implications for our ethical and political reflection. Im-
plicit in many ethical approaches to technology, and especially regarding invasive 
technologies like ICTs, after all, is the model of a struggle between humans and 
technologies (see also Verbeek 2013). While some technological developments can 
be beneficial, this view holds, others compose a threat to humanity, and therefore 
the role of ethicists is to assess if technologies are morally acceptable or not.
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In ethical and political discussions regarding ICTs, the theme of the ‘Panopticon’ 
often plays an important role. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s analysis of Jeremy 
Bentham’s prison design—a dome with a central watchtower from which all prison-
ers can be observed without them knowing if they are being watched or not – some 
people fear that ICTs are creating a panoptic society in which privacy becomes 
ever more problematic, and in which asymmetrical power relations can flourish. 
(Foucault 1975)
However important it is to develop and maintain a critical attitude toward new 
information and communication technologies, this model of a ‘struggle’ between 
technology and society is still based on the dualist metaphysics of subject versus ob-
ject, that ICTs themselves have outdated by reconfiguring the boundaries between 
subjects and objects, as described above. When human beings cannot be understood 
in isolation from technology, and vice versa, approaching their relation in terms 
of struggle and threat, therefore, is like giving a moral evaluation of gravity, or 
language. It does not make much sense to be ‘against’ them, because they form the 
basis of our existence. Technologies have always helped to shape what it means to 
be human. Rather than opposing them, and putting all our efforts in resistance and 
protest, we should develop a productive interaction with them.
But how can such an interaction still be critical, when the boundaries between 
humans and technologies disappear? If human practices and experiences are always 
technologically mediated, there does not seem to be an ‘outside’ position anymore 
with respect to technology. And if there is no outside anymore, from where could 
we criticize technology?
To be sure, a hybrid understanding of humans and technologies does not im-
ply that all roles of technology in human existence are equally desirable, and that 
human beings should redefine themselves as powerless victims of the power of 
technology. It does imply, though, that the ‘opposition model’ of humanity and tech-
nology might not be the most productive model if one wants to change undesirable 
configurations of humans and technologies. Ethics should not focus on determining 
which technologies should be allowed and which should not. Technological devel-
opment will continue, and human existence will change with it. Tempora mutantur, 
nos et mutamur in illis: the times are changing, and we change in them. The main 
focus of ethics, should not be on technology assessment but on technology accom-
paniment. Rather than keeping humanity and technology apart, we should critically 
accompany their intertwinement.
In order to articulate such an alternative model for ethics, it is helpful to con-
nect to the later work of Foucault (see also Verbeek 2013). In his lecture ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ (Foucault 1997), Foucault develops an alternative account of the 
phenomenon of ‘critique’. Foucault is looking for an answer to what he calls ‘the 
blackmail of the Enlightenment’. This blackmail consists in the pressure that is 
exerted upon those who want to criticize the Enlightenment, because all their at-
tempts are typically explained as being ‘against’ the Enlightenment. Anyone who 
dares to do open this discussion immediately raises the suspicion of being against 
rationality, democracy, and scientific inquiry. Foucault, however, explores if an al-
ternative understanding of Enlightenment would be possible. And this exploration 
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is of utmost importance in the context of the ethics of technology as well. Blurring 
the boundaries between humans and technologies, after all, can easily be explained 
as giving up on ethics: because there is no clear boundary to be defended anymore, 
it might seem that ’anything goes’. Therefore, an alternative model for ethics needs 
to be developed.
Foucault’s answer, however trivial it may seem, is to reinterpret Enlightenment 
as an attitude, rather than the beginning of a new era. For Kant, as Foucault ex-
plains, Enlightenment was primarily a way out of “immaturity”: using “reason” 
rather than accepting “someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of 
reason is called for” (Foucault 1997, p. 305). This requires critique: only critique 
can tell us under which conditions “the use of reason is legitimate in order to deter-
mine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped” (Foucault 
1997a, p. 308). But for Foucault, critique must not be understood as an attempt to 
transcend the world—as Kant did—but as an attitude of always looking for the 
limits of what seems to be given and self-evident.
Foucault, in short, reinterprets critique—the ‘enlightened’ activity par excel-
lence—as a form of practical self-inquiry. Critique means: investigating what has 
made us the beings that we are, what conditions our existence and what has shaped 
our current way of living. And, most importantly, it does not require an ‘outside’ 
position, but can only happing on the basis of positioning ourselves ‘at the limit’. 
The human subject, after all, is always situated within the world to which it has a 
relation, and therefore critique can never come from outside. We can never step 
out of the networks of relations that help to shape our existence, to phrase it in a 
Latourian way, but this does not imply that we have to give up on critical reflection 
and self-reflection.
Foucault’s alternative Enlightenment offers an interesting escape from the spe-
cific shape that the blackmail of the Enlightenment has taken on in the ethics of 
technology. The fundamental intertwinement of human beings and information 
technologies implies that the frameworks from which we criticize these technolo-
gies are always mediated by these technologies themselves. We can never step out 
of the mediations in which we are involved. The farthest we can get is: at the limits 
of the situation we are in. Standing at the borders, recognizing the technologically 
mediated character of our existence, our interpretations and judgments, our prac-
tices and preferences, we can investigate the nature and the quality of these media-
tions: where do they come from, what do they do, could they be different?
Rather than letting our selves be blackmailed by the Enlightenment—fearing 
that the boundary-blurring between technology and society would make it impos-
sible to have a reasonable and normative discussion about technology—there is an 
alternative possibility for the ethics of technology. Not the assessment of techno-
logical developments ‘from outside’ is the central goal of ethical reflection then, but 
rather its accompaniment ‘from within’, using a concept from the Belgian philoso-
pher Gilbert Hottois (Hottois 1996) and the recent work of Paul Rabinow (Rabinow 
2011). The crucial question in such a form of ‘ethical technology accompaniment’ is 
not how we could impose ‘limits’ to technological developments, but rather how we 
can deal in responsible ways with the ongoing intertwinement of humans and tech-
nologies. The limit-attitude leads to an ethical approach that is not preoccupied with 
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the question of whether a given technology is morally acceptable or not, but that is 
directed at improving the quality of our lives, as lived with technology. Standing 
at the limits of what mediates our existence, we can evaluate the quality of these 
mediations ‘from within’, and actively engage in reshaping these mediations and 
our own relations toward them.
It needs to be emphasized that this does not imply that all mediations are equally 
desirable, and that there can never be grounds to reject technologies. Rather, it im-
plies that ethical reflection needs to engage more deeply with actual technological 
artifacts and practices. Giving up on an external position does not require us to give 
up all critical distance; it only prevents us from overestimating the distance we can 
take. An ethics of ‘technology accompaniment’ rather than ‘technology assessment’ 
should in fact be seen as a form of ‘governing’ the impact technology can have on 
one’s existence and on society. It replaces the modernist ambition to ‘steer’ technol-
ogy and to ‘protect’ humanity against technological invasions with a more modest 
ambition to ’govern’ technological developments by engaging actively with their 
social and existential implications.
5  Onlife Citizenship
This critical accompaniment of ICTs can only take shape in concrete practices of 
design, use, and implementation, in which human beings can get critically involved 
in how technologies mediate their existence. A critical use of information technol-
ogy then becomes an ‘ascetic practice’, in which human beings explicitly anticipate 
technological mediations, and develop creative appropriations of technologies in 
order to give a desirable shape to these mediations. At the same time, the design of 
information technology becomes an inherently moral activity, in which designers 
do not only develop technological artifacts, but also the social impacts that come 
with it. And policy-making activities regarding the implementation of new tech-
nologies then become ways of governing our technologically mediated world.
Let me return to one of the examples I gave at the beginning of this contribution 
in order to elaborate how this critical accompaniment of technologies could be a 
fruitful form of ethical and political reflection on technology. As indicated above, 
one of the most salient aspects of Google Glass is its impact on interpersonal rela-
tions. The ‘doubling’ of the relations between humans and world that it brings about 
adds a second layer to the communication between people, which remains invisible 
to the other person. When two people meet, they cannot see which information the 
other has available about them. Google’s search engine might reveal private infor-
mation on the basis of face recognition software, or it might confuse the person with 
somebody else. Because this parallel information is only available for the person 
wearing the device, an asymmetry comes about that makes open communication 
impossible and that radically transforms the character of public space and public 
life.
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Dealing with this new technology, then, requires more than asking oneself the 
question if we should allow it to be applied in society, and if so, under which condi-
tions. Rather than aiming for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’, ethical reflection should ask itself how 
this technology could get a desirable place in society. And for answering this ques-
tion, we need to think through the ethical dimension of the design, implementation, 
and use of this technology.
First of all, in the context of use, people will have to develop ways to appropri-
ate this technology, and to integrate it in their daily lives. Typically, people develop 
codes of use for dealing with technologies that have an impact on social life—just 
like it has gradually become normal that people do not answer incoming calls on 
their cell phones when they are in a conversation, for instance. An obvious code 
that could develop would be that people put off their Google Glass when they are in 
a conversation, to prevent that your conversation partner is searching information 
about you on the Internet, or is checking his or her email simultaneously. Still, the 
meaning of a quick glimpse at each other’s face in public space will change for-
ever, because everybody knows that the Google Glass enables people to look right 
through each other. Dealing with implications like this is not only a challenge for 
users, but also requires the attention of designers and policy makers.
Designers should be more aware of the mediations that can occur when people 
use the glasses, in order to make a responsible design. This requires experimenta-
tion, and creative redesign. When, for instance, one of the main problems appears 
to be the possibility that somebody secretly checks someone’s face on the Internet, 
it could be important to introduce a little warning light that gives a signal when the 
face recognition system is on. This would remove an essential element of the hid-
den character of what the glasses can do, and therefore restore part of the symmetry 
that this technology takes away. Another option could be to redesign the software 
in such a way that it can only activate face recognition when looking each other 
explicitly in the eyes for more than five seconds. When people engage in this form 
of contact, they have reached a level of intimacy that is far beyond the regular quick 
exchange of looks in public spaces. Designs like this can make it possible to remain 
relatively anonymous in public spaces, while making contact with each other might 
also become more easy when both parties are open to that and allow more substan-
tial eye contact.
Also the character of the information that is revealed, should be part of the de-
sign of the technology. Google could give (or be obliged to give) people an active 
role in determining their profile that becomes visible when their face is recognized 
and looked up—just like the profile people are now making of themselves on social 
media like Facebook or LinkedIn. In this way, people would have more control over 
the ways in which they are present and visible in public spaces, comparable to the 
impression people make on others in real life, on the basis of their behavior, the way 
they dress, and the reputation they have.
Beside this, users should learn to deal with the effects Google Glass will have on 
their relations with other people—both when they wear the glasses and when they 
are being watched with it. It will not be very difficult to realize that other people 
might have all kinds of information available about you when they look at you. But 
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that awareness should also grow regarding all activities people have on the Internet. 
Google Glass integrates the public space of the Internet with the public spaces ‘in 
real life’. This implies a rearrangement of the boundaries between the public and the 
private, and the coming about of a new public space—as it happened before because 
of other media like the newspaper, the radio, and the television. Rather than merely 
resisting and opposing the negative aspects of this development, we will also need 
to develop new forms of citizenship and citizenship education. Codes of conduct 
and etiquette will have to develop, just like they exist already now in current public 
spaces.
This requires, thirdly, new policy-making activities. If the main question remains 
if we should or should not allow technologies like Google Glass to be introduced 
in our society, we lose the possibility to address the quality of its social implica-
tions. At the same time, a blind and unregulated introduction of this technology in 
society would throw away the possibility of critical reflection and governance. The 
central question for policy-making activities is how Google Glass can be embedded 
in society in good ways. Governance and regulation should focus on the quality 
of this embedding, rather than on the permission for it. This, inevitably, requires 
experimentation that makes it possible to find the right balance between openness 
for change and preservation of what we find valuable. We will need to ask ques-
tions like: which information should be disclosed and which not? Which aspects of 
ourselves belong to the private realm and which do not? And who determines that? 
Should people have the right to adapt the profile that is connected to their visual 
appearance? How can the design of Google Glass embody the central values in our 
society? And how can users be equipped optimally to integrate Google Glass in 
their daily lives in responsible ways?
The real information revolution has yet to begin. The boundaries between human 
beings and information technologies are blurring ever more rapidly. This requires 
a normative framework that gives up the idea that we need to control technologies 
from outside, on the basis of a set of pre-given criteria. Rather, we need to develop 
ever better ways to understand how information technologies affect us, and to get 
explicitly get involved in that process, by critically designing, embedding and using 
information technologies from the perspective of their mediating powers in human 
existence and our technological society.
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